5

GREGORY CLAEYS

The origins of dystopia:
Wells, Huxley and Orwell

Introduction: Malice in Wonderland – concepts and theory

Where did it all go wrong? When did the vision of heaven on earth become an anticipation of hell? In many accounts we emerge from the hopeful, dream-like state of Victorian optimism to pass through what H. G. Wells called the age of confusion into a nightmarish twentieth century, soon powerfully symbolized by the grotesque slaughter of the First World War. Enlightenment optimism respecting the progress of reason and science was now displaced by a sense of the incapacity of humanity to restrain its newly created destructive powers. From that time ideal societies have accordingly been more commonly portrayed negatively in dystopian rather than utopian form. Like most other parts of *terra utopus*, however, the concept of dystopia has been much contested, many eutopias or ideal societies having dystopic elements and vice versa. Dystopias are often described as 'conservative', though they may in fact be sharply critical of the societies they reflect, as we will see. 'Dystopia' is often used interchangeably with 'anti-utopia' or 'negative utopia', by contrast to utopia or 'eutopia' (good place), to describe a fictional portrayal of a society in which evil, or negative social and political developments, have the upper hand, or as a satire of utopian aspirations which attempts to show up their fallacies, or which demonstrate, in B. F. Skinner's words, 'ways of life we must be sure to avoid' – in the unlikely event that we can agree on particulars.[1] Yet as we will see, the most famous exemplar of the genre, Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, was not intended to be anti-utopian as such.

The term 'dystopia' enters common currency only in the twentieth century, though it appears intermittently beforehand (dys-topia or 'cacotopia', bad place, having been used by John Stuart Mill in an 1868 parliamentary debate). The flowering of the dystopian genre was preceded by a variety of satirical tropes. Francis Bacon's scientific ambitions were brought down several notches in Swift's famous parody in book three of *Gulliver's Travels* (1726). The dystopian ideal has also been linked both historically and

107

logically to proclamations of the 'end of utopia' (for instance in Marcuse, *Five Lectures*, 1970)[2], and has sometimes also been wedded to the now-debunked hypothesis of the 'end of history'. In the wake of totalitarianism it was also suggested, in the works of Karl Popper (see *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 1950),[3] Jacob Talmon, and others, that the utopian impulse was itself inherently dystopian. That is to say, the desire to create a much improved society in which human behaviour was dramatically superior to the norm implies an intrinsic drift towards punitive methods of controlling behaviour which inexorably results in some form of police state.

This contention, effectively a *reductio ad absurdam*, was anticipated decades earlier in the suggestion by the Italian psychologist Cesare Lombroso that all socialists were 'lunatics', or deviant personalities, as well as in the sociologist Herbert Spencer's allegation that all forms of socialism implied 'slavery' or some variation on the 'servile state'. It is flawed for two main reasons. On the one hand, logically, it assumes that utopianism seeks perfectibility, and thus, incapable of accepting less, must punish whatever falls below this standard. Most utopias however do not demand or anticipate *perfection* as such, but accept considerably *improved* behaviour as an attainable norm. On the other, historically, it fails to acknowledge that many forms of utopian practice, such as monasticism, intentional communities of various kinds, and many other variants on 'ideal' societies, have not proven 'totalitarian'. Thus while we may continue to debate the ambiguity of, for instance, the fourth voyage to the land of the Houyhnhnms in Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, the broad implication that all forms of theorizing which aim at a vast improvement in human society are 'totalitarian' or 'dystopian' has itself been disproven by history. Many of us indeed live today in the utopias of the past, in circumstances vastly better than those most of our ancestors even dreamt of. Thus the liberal paradigm of universal opulence and stable democracy is itself also a utopian ideal, and itself susceptible to dystopian failure, both economically and environmentally. There is of course something in the argument that, just as one person's terrorist is another's freedom-fighter, so is one person's utopia another's dystopia. Indisputably, thus, whether a given text can be described as a dystopia or utopia will depend on one's perspective of the narrative outcome. Such ambiguity should, however, be a provocative source of discussion, rather than a rationale for dismissing the genre as such.

Nonetheless it is generally conceded that in the twentieth century dystopia becomes the predominant expression of the utopian ideal, mirroring the colossal failures of totalitarian collectivism. This chapter will focus on the 'turn' towards dystopia from the late nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century, which is here portrayed as foreshadowed by two preceding movements of

a similar type. It concentrates on British utopian literature, the richest such tradition, and that which has produced its two best-known examples. It is suggested that this 'turn' was inherently ambiguous from the start; that is to say, that its two major features, the socialist engineering of human behaviour via the reconstitution of society; and the eugenic engineering of human behaviour via biological manipulation, were viewed widely as both positive and negative developments. This is illustrated by offering a brief introduction to the key texts which define the genre, initially by H. G. Wells, but more especially Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, as well as some lesser texts which define its range and breadth. Their common theme is the quasi-omnipotence of a monolithic, totalitarian state demanding and normally exacting complete obedience from its citizens, challenged occasionally but usually ineffectually by vestigial individualism or systemic flaws, and relying upon scientific and technological advances to ensure social control.

Before commencing, two notes, one theoretical, one historical. Firstly, we should briefly consider demarcating the boundaries of the 'dystopian' concept. The term is used here in the broad sense of portraying feasible negative visions of social and political development, cast principally in fictional form. By 'feasible' we imply that no extraordinary or utterly unrealistic features dominate the narrative. Much of the domain of science fiction is thus excluded from this definition: Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898), for instance, is not based on the extrapolation of some existing trend as such, and is thus not a dystopia; 'Martians' belong not to the realm of dystopia but to that of science fiction, or fantasy *pur et simple*. (Jules Verne thought Wells too unrealistic, as a consequence.) If of course there had been evidence of extra-terrestrial life either in 1898 or now, these boundaries would necessarily shift; they are fluid by definition, or to use Wells's own formula, *kinetic*. By this definition, totalitarian dystopias are clearly dystopias, that is, mirrored if refracted realities. A voyage in a balloon in 1863 thus is not science fiction; a journey to the moon is. A voyage to another planet was science fiction in 1850, but will probably not be in 2020. Eugenic dystopias remain within the bounds of possibility. Conquest by alien beings, or robots, or the final calling of time by God at Judgment Day, may portray dystopic elements (as well as utopic, or both simultaneously). But texts portraying such events are not 'dystopias' as such.

The first dystopian turn

Secondly, we should note that just as the seminal political moment definitive of modernity was the French Revolution, so we witness in this period

the first evidence of a theoretical and fictional 'dystopian turn' of the type more commonly associated with the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Satires upon Enlightenment conceptions of a life lived according to the principles of reason appear in the preceding period, notably in Swift and in Burke's *Vindication of Natural Society* (1756); indeed much utopian writing in this period can be read as a discourse upon corruption and degeneration. Fantasies of the 'Last Man' and of the Apocalypse occur intermittently in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But it is only with the French Revolution that we witness a dialectical relationship emerging between three elements: utopian thought, here some of the underlying principles of the Revolution; the creation of fictional utopias; and a fictional anti- or dystopian response. In this case, on the one hand we witness fictional works inspired by leading trends in utopian thought, notably by Thomas Spence (*The Constitution of Spensonia*, 1801), and by acolytes of William Godwin, particularly Thomas Northmore's *Memoirs of Planetes* (1795).[4] On the other, these texts were met with a barrage of fictional satires of the 'new philosophy', loosely defined as 'perfectibility', which portrayed Godwinian invocations of a society governed by reason as inducing disaster, such as Hannah More's *The History of Mr Fantom* (1797). This is also the point at which both major strands of the later dystopian turn, population control and socialism, are addressed by the most famous anti-utopian text of the nineteenth century, and a key source for Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), T. R. Malthus's *Essay on Population* (1798).[5] This in its first edition targeted Condorcet and William Godwin, and in its second, substituted the founder of British socialism, Robert Owen, for Godwin.

At the very end of this cycle of texts appeared Mary Shelley's gothic masterpiece, *Frankenstein* (1818), often held to be the founding text of the genre of science fiction, but also partly a satire on the failed aspirations of the Revolution, heralding one of the key themes of late dystopian writings.[6] Subtitled 'or the Modern Prometheus', the work explores the perils of usurping the divine monopoly on creation, the creature standing in part for the 'new man' of the revolutionary ideal, and also centrally focuses on the Godwinian (or Rousseauesque) theme of naturally virtuous individuals being corrupted by society. For many, the theme of science- (or scientist) gone-wild, then, first heralds dystopia, from Swift onwards. Thereafter science, technology, utopia and dystopia move forward increasingly in tandem, and after 1900 the characteristic form of the imaginary society would be both dystopian and often formally cast in the genre of science fiction, set normally in the future rather than the past or elsewhere in the here-and-now.

The second dystopian turn

Owenism produced little in the way of literary utopianism, and correspondingly little by way of anti- or dystopian satire. Two developments shape the clearer and more traditionally identified 'turn' towards dystopia in the closing decades of the nineteenth century: eugenics and socialism. Utopian thought in both Europe and North America had been strongly affected by Owenism, Fourierism and Saint-Simonism from the 1820s through mid-century. From the early 1880s, however, the fictional genre becomes dominated by the promises of these two, often interwoven, ideals of social and individual improvement, both positively and negatively. Many writers were keen to urge the compatibility of socialism and Darwinism, notably Karl Pearson, who saw socialism as the 'logical outcome of the law of Malthus'.[7] In Britain, Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872) discussed the new Darwinian creed, while Edward Bulwer-Lytton's *The Coming Race* (1871) described a society in which Darwinian competition had been eliminated. On the socialist side, William Morris's *News from Nowhere* (1890) espoused a proto-environmentalist socialist ideal wedded to Ruskinian aestheticism. Many works united these themes seamlessly, such as Walter Besant's *The Inner House* (1888), in which physical decay is arrested by scientific advance, and socialism is the only accepted form of organization. Eugenics might well be described as the 'Darwinian utopia', and the theme of racial war recurs frequently in later nineteenth-century utopias, sometimes with the 'Anglo-Saxons' winning (e.g., Robert William Cole, *The Struggle for Empire: A Story of the Year 2236*, 1900), and sometimes other races, such as the Japanese (e.g., [Ernest George Henham], John Trevena, *The Reign of the Saints*, 1911). In some 'utopias' black peoples have been entirely eliminated (e.g., William Hay, *Three Hundred Years Hence*, 1881, p. 256) – but for non-whites this would be a dystopia. From the 1890s onwards the appearance of an increasing number of dystopian texts thus seemingly indicates a negative trend in the wider utopian genre as a whole. I have argued elsewhere, however, that this is not the case.[8] A large number of texts do portray the socialist revolution gone awry, and the destruction of individualism at the hands of socialist revolutionaries, such as Charles Fairchild's *The Socialist Revolution of 1888* (1884). Commonly national collapse has been instigated by such revolutions, with widespread poverty resulting, as in *A Radical Nightmare: Or, England Forty Years Hence* (1885). One of the earliest is Percy Clarke's *The Valley Council; or, Leaves from the Journal of Thomas Bateman of Canbelego Station, N.S.W.* (1891), where a dictatorship results from a socialist revolution. Not uncommonly socialist and eugenicist themes are combined in dystopian form, as in *Red England: A Tale of the Socialist Horror* (1909), where after the revolution

three doctors must approve all marriages, and children are removed from their parents' care and raised by the state.

Eugenic themes, however, were also capable of being portrayed positively in many works, to such a degree, indeed, as to prevent us from positing a negative 'turn' in the genre as such generated from this source. Sometimes this is as simple as a reduction in family size and reorientation of society towards greater productivity and efficiency, as in Frank Perry Coste's *Towards Utopia (Being Speculations in Social Evolution)* (1894). But more overtly positive eugenics endorsements appear in many works. In *Pyrna: A Commune; or, Under the Ice* (1875), a society beneath a Swiss glacier is encountered where there is perfect equality, fraternal love and community of property and children. But no unhealthy children are permitted to survive. Similarly, in *Posterity: Its Verdicts and Its Methods; or Democracy A.D. 2100* (1897), medical examinations for organic diseases are a precondition of citizenship, and the 'morally unsound and the mentally diseased' are prohibited offspring. In G. Read Murphy's *Beyond the Ice* (1894) a marriage bureau regulates pairing, while in Andrew Acworth's *A New Eden* (1896) family size is restricted to two children, and euthanasia is the norm. In *Quintura: Its Singular People and Remarkable Customs* (1886) all children are raised by the state, and priority is given to hygienic improvement.

Other themes helped to nourish the dystopian flavour of the epoch, including the threat of a Prussian invasion of Britain. In G. T. Chesney's *The Battle of Dorking* (1871), for instance, written during the Franco-Prussian War, poorly trained English volunteers are swiftly routed by a technologically superior force. In *Cromwell the Third: Or, the Jubilee of Liberty* (1886), Britain is annexed by Germany. 'Alien' invasions would merely extend such fears into an ever more fantastic domain. Ecological catastrophe was firstly portrayed strikingly in Richard Jefferies's *After London; or, Wild England* (1885), one of the sources of Morris's *News from Nowhere*.[9] Yet the yearning for primitivism, the simpler life, was not uniformly a dystopian theme, either; Morris himself famously confessed to feeling consoled that barbarism might again flood the world. And there are arcadian elements in many other socialist utopias of the period, including some usually termed dystopias, such as Robert Blatchford's *The Sorcery Shop* (1909), as well as in utopian thought (Edward Carpenter, for instance, mentioned Melville's *Typee* as a model for future socialist emulation).[10]

H. G. Wells's dystopian *entrée*

Herbert George Wells is a writer famous for, amongst other things, commencing his career amidst an aura of *fin de siècle* pessimism, by writing a

number of dystopian works, and then embracing utopia and exchanging degeneration for regeneration.[11] Wells thus initially epitomizes what we have here termed the 'second dystopian turn', but also the outpouring of late nineteenth-century utopian sentiment, often in taking up the very same themes, notably authority, leadership and the advancement (or threat) of science and technology. Many of his early works go beyond dystopia, as defined here, into science fiction, often, instigated by his scientific training under T. H. Huxley, by moving beyond short-term to long-term evolution. That is to say, they breach our expectations of the genuinely possible within the social and especially the scientific constraints of the day, while offering a moral tale or prescient warning which clearly has contemporary application.

Whether evolution was controllable by a species manifestly often not up to the task of the utopian 'taking hold' of evolution, as *Men Like Gods* insisted, was indeed to become perhaps *the* quintessentially Wellsian theme. As defined here, *The Time Machine* (1895), *The Invisible Man* (1897) and *The First Men in the Moon* (1901), are works of science fiction, while *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896) is a dystopia. Yet all are extrapolations of present trends of one form or another, varying in their degree of plausibility. In *The Time Machine*, perhaps his most pessimistic work, Wells recounts the discovery of a world of AD 802,701 which is divided into two great groups, a master-race, the Eloi, 'a real aristocracy, armed with a perfected science and working to a logical conclusion the industrial system of to-day', and an underground slave race, the Morlocks. The satire here is upon both communism and schemes of selective breeding. *The Island of Doctor Moreau* – in which Wells acknowledged that Swift (notably book four of *Gulliver's Travels*) loomed large – focuses more narrowly on scientific control of genetic development. With the creation of 'beast-men' or 'quasi-human monsters' – a prospect Wells thought plausible enough – man becomes 'at last as remorseless as Nature', and Promethean themes again abound: we are near enough to *Frankenstein* to appreciate the parallels. In *When the Sleeper Awakes* (1899), set 200 years in the future, a slave-state is ruled by a quasi-Nietzschean usurper named Ostrog (a Russian word for prison); this is 'no Utopia, no Socialistic state' of a Bellamy, Morris or Hudson type (all are mentioned). Why? What went wrong? Corrosive urbanization, the creation of 'this great machine of the city', concentration of wealth, and an incessant economic struggle, compared to the 'idyllic easy-going life' of the nineteenth century. Satirized here are Carlyle's hero-worship ideal and Plato, and there are echoes yet again of Swift. Disease has been virtually abolished, but the common man, gulled by 'the world-wide falsehoods of the news-tellers,' remains 'helpless in the hands of demagogue

and organiser, individually cowardly, individually swayed by appetite, collectively incalculable'.[12] The great aim? Simply to retain property in the hands of the rich.

While not properly a dystopia, though it satirizes human folly, *The First Men in the Moon* (1901) is a much less theoretically significant work. Written during the Boer War, it portrays the export of imperial violence, with humans killing the Selenite lunarians as they had slain savages on earth. Wells here took up the analogy of Columbus and the Americas.[13] From 1901, however, he began to devote himself to the life-long pursuit of creating the world-state, sometimes called socialism, sometimes republicanism or 'cosmopolis'. His last moment of hesitation was expressed in the 'social imaginings' of *Anticipations* (1901), in which eugenic themes continue, and the dying out of the less efficient races is regarded as seemingly inevitable. But Wells had now firmly turned to both prophecy and advocacy. Thereafter he would regard a world-state as mankind's only solution to its gravest social and scientific problems, though his idea of what this would entail would in turn feed other dystopian visions. He remained certain that a superior caste or class had to guide this movement, exploring their role in so doing in elaborate detail in *A Modern Utopia* (1905), and practically in the Fabian Society. Like many of his generation, he had faith in the capacity of scientists and engineers to bring happiness to the masses, even if the creation of the world-state had to be instigated by planetary catastrophe, as in *In the Days of the Comet* (1906) or nuclear war (in *The World Set Free*, 1914). But as the new century advanced Wells also became ever less certain as to how to create, maintain and motivate this elite. By his death in 1946 he was deeply pessimistic about historical developments, his growing sense of dismay fed by a Gibbonian sense of recurrence.

A further writer worthy of note from this period is Yevgeny Zamyatin (1884–1927), who was influenced by Wells, and was in turn a key source later for Orwell. Zamyatin's *We* (written 1921, published in English in 1924) was anticipated by Jerome K. Jerome's story, 'The New Utopia' (1891), in which post-revolutionary individuals are assigned numbers rather than names, are forced to dress similarly, and lead highly regimented lives supervised by 'guardians'. Zamyatin describes the One State, in which people live in glass houses, and where the 'Benefactor', constantly elected unanimously, is the ruling figure, and sex is freely available if strictly controlled. Seemingly futile human resistance to this (by the 'enemies of happiness'),[14] their discovery, torture and 'cure' unite Zamyatin's and Orwell's portrayals. Orwell wrote in 1946 that *We* satirized 'not any particular country but the implied aims of industrial civilisation'.[15] This remains an important clue to his own aims in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932)

In its outlines Huxley's text is familiar to most readers.[16] The world described, some 600 years 'After Ford', is one in which institutionalized eugenic engineering underpins a rigidly stratified class society, the World State, based upon breeding both intelligent rulership and complacent subservience, and governed by a privileged group of controllers. Huxley later termed this 'the completely controlled, collectivised society'.[17] 'Fordism' represents the subordination of humanity to the machine and to the scientific ideal as such. Children are raised in common, behavioural manipulation is elevated to a highly refined science, and, all books and monuments relating to the former society having been destroyed, the past has been erased. There is no need for mass brutality. With the exception of a few 'savages' left to their own devices, science has tamed society, and produced what Huxley termed 'a really efficient totalitarian state' in which the population of slaves 'love their servitude'.[18] They do so because sexual promiscuity is the norm, and anxiety-alleviating drugs, notably the 'perfect drug', the euphoric *soma*, guarantee a 'holiday from reality'. Hedonism, in short, is the predominant ethos. Everyone is happy, and endlessly reminds themselves of the fact: psychobabble rules, in consequence.

There are many targets here: utilitarianism, 'the horrors' of Wells's World State (*Men Like Gods* is often seen as the satirical object; Huxley once described its author as 'a rather horrid, vulgar little man'), totalitarianism, utopia itself, historical fatalism and, above all thought- and mind-control. There is, however, an alternative worldview presented. From the Savage Reservation comes an uncorrupted specimen of the former state of humanity, John, to challenge the assumptions of the established order. He represents art, science, humanity, individuality, religion and the folly of humankind. What, then, was Huxley's point? Did he really think such a society might emerge from the present? Is this a celebration of some variation on the Noble Savage, a romantic rebellion against conformity and materialistic hedonism? Was this a *realistic* dystopia, or does the point lie elsewhere? The 'whole idea' of *Brave New World*, Huxley once said, was that if you could iron people 'into a kind of uniformity, if you were able to manipulate their genetic background … if you had a government sufficiently unscrupulous you could do these things without any doubt'.[19] Where then does Huxley wish our sympathies to lie? Not, certainly, with the hapless rulers of the future world, who reach for soma at the slightest anxiety. Even the Controller admits that the state of happiness achieved in the new society appears 'pretty squalid in comparison with the over-compensations for misery'. Yet in 1932, after the millions of deaths of the First World War, the

stability achieved here was no mean outcome. Even at the cost of unbelief? 'If you allowed yourselves to think of God, you wouldn't allow yourselves to be degraded by pleasant vices', says the savage, God being 'the reason for everything noble and fine and heroic', to be met by the riposte that 'civilization has absolutely no need of nobility or heroism', that there is no 'right to be unhappy'. Are we then to identify with the old-fashioned savage, still wedded to ideas of love, monogamy, marriage, 'freedom', in short, first expressed by throwing away the soma boxes? And does Huxley wish us to see the assertion of such ideals as contingent upon religious belief, with no discernible secular alternative to mindless hedonism? The answer is apparently yes. The satire, in other words, is as much upon contemporary materialism and consumerism as upon the eugenic super-state; it is upon the threads which connect America with the Germany of Hitler and the Russia of Stalin, the human willingness to renounce a more diverse life in favour of certainty and stability, the 'primal and the ultimate need'.[20] Critics have accused Huxley of anti-American snobbism. Yet this is somewhat beside the point: Huxley is a critic of modernity as such, and America is only a leading instance of its definitive characteristics. His characters are named after Russians, French, British, Italians and Americans. The problem is not nationality, and it is not ideology.

Huxley's chief concern, then, is much more with how servitude becomes attractive than it is with science or technology as such. In response to his critics he proposed in a 1946 preface to *Brave New World* that a better world might be imagined in which science and technology were 'made for man, not … as though man were to be adapted and enslaved to them'. The economics were to be decentralized and Henry-Georgian, the politics Kropotkinesque and cooperative, and a quasi-religious knowledge of the Godhead or 'Final End' was posited to which utilitarianism was subordinated, bringing a 'philosophical completeness' to the original novel. But Huxley was in fact growing more, not less, pessimistic, particularly about overpopulation; he worried in 1950 that the world might reach three billion before commencing to diminish.[21] *Ape and Essence* (1949) again raised fears of both science and leaders, particularly in combination, gone awry, with 'progress' portrayed like an uncontrollable genie released from the bottle. In *Brave New World Revisited* (1958) he returned to consider the issue of 'freedom and its enemies'. Critics had accused *Brave New World* of moral failure in a time of crisis. But nearly thirty years of reflection had proven to Huxley how successful the techniques of mind-control could be. He admitted that the very desire for freedom seemed to be 'on the wane'. While paying homage to Orwell, Huxley insisted that behavioural engineering in both Soviet-style and western regimes was enormously threatening. Yet he was

much more explicit now that the greatest danger promoting such trends was world overpopulation, the probability of which 'leading through unrest to dictatorship becomes a virtual certainty'.[22] Degeneration into uniformity through loss of the sense of freedom is thus still a key theme. But is religion still an antidote? To an impressive degree, Huxley now opted for freedom of information as the key to withstanding mass manipulation and an explicitly capitalist ethos of conditioned consumption. 'Democracy', in the sense of collective, conscious self-government, was now more specifically pitted against capitalist hedonism. Huxley still worried about drugs, and about communism. He was not an egalitarian, and doubted whether the modern world exhibited any 'improvements in individual virtue and intelligence'.[23] But the most insidious enemy lay in the application of the techniques of mind control to advertising, to politics, to undermining the sense of reality and reinforcing egotism and hedonism. Democracy was to drown in popcorn and toothpaste, with citizenship debased to a mere commodity, not to be stomped under the Hitlerian jackboot. Huxley proposed limiting political campaign spending, and even banning 'anti-rational propaganda' in election campaigns.[24] The answer, then, was not religion: it was birth control – requiring an attack on some religions – and rationalism in politics.

Huxley's later novel, *Island* (1962), is usually described as a Buddhist- and drug-inspired utopia whose engagement with spirituality was an effort to compensate for the apparent moral impasse of *Brave New World*. Huxley himself termed it 'a kind of reverse *Brave New World* … a Topian rather than a Utopian phantasy, a phantasy dealing with a place, a *real* place and *time*, rather than a phantasy dealing with *no* place and time'.[25] In both instances society has conquered violence, crime, hunger and inhumanity. However, if it reveals Huxley's search for more humane religious principles, *Island* lacks the degree of confrontation with the problems of hedonism and mass manipulation which mark his chief work. Pavlov makes an appearance; the problem is still collective somnambulism.[26] But the response is not on a scale sufficient to answer the questions left begging in *Brave New World*. The religious answer, too, is private and individual, the product of inner self-mastery, at best bounded by a small community like John Humphrey Noyes's Oneida, which Huxley admired, not a mass collective bond of public worship. Yet this at least lay within the bounds of possibility. For Huxley had no faith in utopias where people were portrayed 'radically unlike human beings … quite different from what they are and from what, throughout recorded history, they have always been'.[27] (He condemned Swift's obsessive reluctance to acknowledge the realistic humanity of the Yahoos in *Gulliver's Travels*.) The answer, then, lay in a more 'rational mode' of democracy, one in which 'a ruling aristocracy of mind' – but not

one based upon eugenics – was given a much more prominent role, in order to balance self-interest, demagoguery and corruption. Here a crucial role was to be played by those capable of practising the 'disinterested virtues', and it was this that religion, itself aiming at 'non-attachment', sought as its secular end. Here too Huxley worried that the worship of man, with 'all the virtues and perfections of God have been lodged in humanity', posed a significant danger, as did equivalent devotion to party, state, nation or race. It permitted immersion in 'the sub-human world of crowd emotion', which was the most effective totalitarian tool. Yet Huxley was not opposed to intelligent planning for the future. He may have lacked Orwell's commitment to a socialist variation on collectivism, but he praised Roosevelt's and other attempts to anticipate the results of technological developments and similar reforms so long as they were 'carried out by the right sort of means and in the right sort of governmental, administrative and educational contexts', that is to say, in an ethically sound manner, and through 'decentralization and responsible self-government'. And he retained an enduring interest in whether small-scale communities of intelligent, like-minded individuals could further such ends.[28]

Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949)

Unlike *Brave New World*, George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was written after much of the scale and enormity of totalitarian brutality had been revealed.[29] Orwell's dystopian world-state is blunt, stark and pitiless. Consent rests upon punishment and fear rather than the manipulation of pleasure. Conformity is instilled by routine practice rather than eugenic conditioning; the abuse of science is Huxley's great theme, that of power, Orwell's.[30] Here too individuality has been eradicated, but much less comfortably, at a much higher price. Less secure, the regime has to work harder to maintain order. History to Ford is merely 'bunk'; here it must be continuously rewritten. Many readers see both novels as pitting the hapless individual against society in an unwinnable contest. Yet if Huxley's target was the agreeable self-deceptive conformity of capitalist society, and the obsessive, infantile grasping for happiness of the moderns, Orwell's was less distant from this than is often recognized. Huxley's work is often described as anti-materialistic, Orwell's rarely so, Huxley as a man engaged in permanent religious crisis, Orwell not. And while Orwell's great work was at one level intensely political, Huxley's has often been described as having few political overtones at all.

This section examines George Orwell's novel in the light of four issues. Firstly, it asks the 'realist' question as to how the work mirrored or distorted

the totalitarian world Orwell satirized. Secondly, it argues that *Nineteen Eighty-Four* represented for Orwell not merely a satire of totalitarianism, but the rejection of many other aspects of modernity. Thirdly, it contends that an illumination of a number of preceding texts assists in our interpretation of the main text here. And finally, it suggests that one of the major themes which emerges in our interpretation of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is Orwell's fear, evident from the mid-1930s onwards, that intellectuals in the socialist movement had been corrupted by power-worship, and hence would not function as capable or morally honest leaders in any new socialist society. Like Wells, Huxley (who also detested the *trahison des clercs*) and other writers of the period, Orwell thus recognized the problem of leadership to be central to the design of any viable future society.

The term 'totalitarianism', first introduced in 1928, but central to thinking during the Cold War period (1947–91), purports to define the common core of both dictatorships in terms of a militantly anti-liberal, anti-bourgeois philosophy hostile to most ideas of individualism and individual rights in particular. Unlike previous ideas of tyranny, including monarchical absolutism and military dictatorship, the key aspect of the new ideal was held to be the desire for complete control over the hearts and bodies, minds and souls, of the citizens of the nation. Totalitarian regimes assumed seven main features:

(1) a one-party state with hegemony over the secret police, and a monopoly over economic, cultural and informational sources; fascists see this state as the focus of the spiritual unity of the nation, possessing a will of its own, and having nothing existing outside it, while communists view the state as an extension of proletarian power during an interim 'dictatorship of the proletariat';

(2) a technological basis to centralized power, e.g., especially through the use of the media and surveillance techniques;

(3) the willingness to destroy large numbers of domestic 'enemies' in the name of the goals of the regime; such as the Jews under the Nazis, the kulaks (rich peasants) by Stalin; or the intellectuals by Pol Pot;

(4) the use of 'total terror' (an emphasis particularly associated with the work of Hannah Arendt) to intimidate the population and ensure complete loyalty;

(5) the willingness of the regime to annihilate all boundaries between the individual and the party/state, by destroying most intermediary organizations and politicizing any which remain, such as youth organizations;

(6) a 'totalist' philosophy or ideology which demands absolute loyalty and sacrifice, and the absolute submission of the citizen to the party/state,

leaving no part of private life unpoliticized; for fascists this was based more on the idea of necessary myths for the masses, for Stalinists, it rested upon a true account of necessary historical development based on Marx's materialist conception of history; in both instances society becomes extremely militarized;

(7) a cult of leadership: in fascism, the leader embodies the spirit, will and virtues of the people, and is identified with the nation; in communism, despite the fact that Marx offered no theory of leadership as such, an equally strong cult emerged around Lenin, Stalin and later leaders like Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung.

In order to see how this analysis of totalitarianism meshed with other criticisms of those aspects of modernity which Orwell found most disturbing we must first consider the development of Orwell's thought prior to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Orwell was born as Eric Blair in Bengal in 1903, to a 'lower-upper-middle class' family with a history of colonial service. He early and long possessed a strong sense of his own inferiority as well as the hypocrisy, drudgery and soullessness of his class. His earliest memories of St Cyprian's school (described in 'Such, Such Were the Joys') were of 'a continuous triumph of the strong over the weak'.[31] After a period at Britain's leading public school, Eton, in which he underwent a 'Tory anarchist' or individualist phase[32] and demonstrated a strong love of nature and a pronounced sense of the Graeco-Roman ideal of citizenship, Orwell showed his 'natural hatred of authority'[33] by going to Burma as a colonial policeman between 1922 and 1927. Here he became overtly anti-imperialist. His first major novel, *Burmese Days*, describes the British Empire as 'simply a device for giving trade monopolies to the English'. But we here also encounter Orwell's earliest criticisms of modern 'progress' as such. At one point, for instance, the narrator gazes out upon the jungle, and envisions that in 200 years 'All this will be gone – forests, monasteries, pagodas all vanished. And instead, pink villas fifty yards apart … with all the gramophones playing the same tune. And all the forests shaved flat, chewed into wood pulp for the News of the World, or sawn up into gramophone cases.' And here, too, Orwell offers his first insights into a world dominated by officialdom and the administrative mentality, describing the colonial atmosphere as 'a stifling, stultifying world in which to live … a world in which every word and every thought is censored'.[34]

During the middle 1930s Orwell rapidly established his reputation as a novelist, writing *Down and Out in Paris & London* (1933), which dealt with poverty and unemployment; *A Clergyman's Daughter* (1935), which linked the themes of poverty and the question of how to live a meaningful life after the loss of religious faith; and *Keep the Aspidistra Flying* (1936),

which dwelt on the motif of individual failure in the face of a system of degrading work. We here also encounter Orwell's first view of socialism, which he parodied as 'Some kind of Aldous Huxley Brave New World: only not so amusing. Four hours a day in a model factory, tightening up bolt number 6003. Rations served out in grease-proof paper at the communal kitchen. Community-hikes from Marx Hostel to Lenin Hostel and back. Free abortion-clinics on all corners.'[35]

This view was to change dramatically swiftly. At the end of 1936 Orwell went to Spain to join Republican resistance to Franco's coup. In *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) he condemned not only fascism but also Moscow's subversion of the Republican cause. As importantly, he wrote that in Spain he had 'seen wonderful things, and at last really believe in Socialism, which I never did before'.[36] On his return to Britain this commitment was exemplified in *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937). But this account of the life of the poor in the industrial north of Britain also included the observation that the physique of the people was declining because of 'the modern industrial technique which provides you with cheap substitutes for everything', adding that it might be found 'in the long run that tinned food is a deadlier weapon than the machine gun'. Orwell now argued that socialism, 'wholeheartedly applied, is a way out', because it would at least give the world enough to eat. But he also condemned socialist intellectuals, who included too many fruit juice drinkers, nudists and sandal-wearers, as being out of touch with the common people. Many socialists he feared also had an overly enlarged sense of order, and tended to see mechanical progress as an end-in-itself, 'almost as a kind of religion', or cult of order and efficiency. But, protested Orwell, 'we can actually feel the tendency of the machine to make a fully human life impossible', for machinery tended 'to frustrate the human need for effort and creation'. The logical end of mechanical progress was 'to reduce the human being to something resembling a brain in a bottle', even if 'the machine has got to be accepted … grudgingly and suspiciously'.[37] In the last and best of his pre-war novels, *Coming Up For Air* (1939), this hostility to modernity as such is again a key theme. At one point the narrator enters a milk-bar, then one of the great novelties of the period. He exclaims:

> There's a kind of atmosphere about these places that gets me down. Everything slick and shiny and streamlined; mirrors, enamel, and chromium plate whichever direction you look in. Everything spent on the decorations and nothing on the food. No real food at all. Just lists of stuff with American names, sort of phantom stuff that you can't taste and can hardly believe in the existence of … A sort of propaganda floating around, mixed up with the noise of the radio, to the effect that food doesn't matter, comfort doesn't matter, nothing matters except slickness and shininess and streamlining.[38]

121

This resistance to what Bernard Crick has referred to as 'Fordification',[39] a combination of mass-production techniques with a technocentric aesthetic, was to remain an enduring theme. Orwell's growing concern was particularly with the totalitarian disregard for historical truth, as well as the possibility that mass propaganda could produce a population who no longer loved liberty. Increasingly he feared the destruction of the ideal of the 'autonomous individual', and the belief that socialists might so blindly worship at the altar of industrial progress that they would forgo democracy and any other but mass-produced goods.

In the early 1940s Orwell's critique shifted in several ways. He began to pay greater heed to the dangers of technocrats and bureaucrats in general. During the Second World War he warned of the dangers of what he termed at one point 'the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life', which he claimed Hitler had recognized.[40] He now increasingly believed, too, that both fascism and communism were 'moving towards a form of oligarchical collectivism'.[41] Orwell however clearly retained his socialist commitment during the wartime period as well as after. In *The Lion and the Unicorn* (1941) he attempted to define a unique brand of British socialism which could reconcile the need to centralize the economy with a sense of the value of freedom, privacy, the dislike of regimentation and an incorruptible belief in law. He hoped that working-class culture, which he believed did not encourage power-worship, and retained instead a vital measure of moral integrity, might help sustain these values. But he still warned of 'the persistent effort to chip away English morale and spread a hedonistic, what-do-I-get-out-of-it attitude to life'.[42] Thus, as he put it later, England might provide 'the much needed alternative to Russian authoritarianism on the one hand and American materialism on the other'.[43] Little of this optimism, however, was evident in his wartime satire, *Animal Farm* (1945), though this work, in which the pigs who lead the revolution against human exploitation eventually come to resemble their former masters, foreshadows perhaps the chief theme of Orwell's greatest work, the betrayal of the revolution by intellectuals.

Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949)

While *Nineteen Eighty-Four* has commonly been interpreted as an anti-Stalinist tract, it has been suggested here that Orwell combined certain anti-modernist and anti-capitalist themes with a hostility to Stalinism and Fascism. Others have taken a similar view. Richard Rees, for instance, has seen the main thrust of the work as being 'simply that our industrial civilisation is tending to deracinate and debilitate us', while John Mander describes

the novel as 'an anthology of all the things he hated most; this explains why many of its horrors are capitalist rather than Stalinist horrors'.[44] Despite the prominence of the anti-communist interpretation of the work, Orwell himself wrote that it was

> NOT intended as an attack on Socialism or on the British Labour Party (of which I am a supporter) but as a show-up of the perversions to which a centralised economy is liable and which have already partly been realised in Communism and Fascism. I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily *will* arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it *could* arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences.[45]

Nineteen Eighty-Four is set in Oceania, Airstrip One, which has become an American province.[46] As explained in Emmanuel Goldstein's *Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*, the book within the book, which turns out to be written by Inner Party leaders, the existing world system is one of three great states engaged in permanent warfare both for labour-power and as a means of ruling their own populations.[47] These wars expend the results of machine production without actually raising the standard of living, which Orwell implies would threaten their power and legitimacy because greater equality would threaten hierarchy. The three states share the same set of values, variously defined as Ingsoc, Neo-Bolshevism and the Obliteration of the Self. The object of war is thus to maintain the ruling structures of the three regimes, hence the truthfulness of the apparent paradox, 'War is Peace.' In Oceania the Party is an oligarchy, though 'not a class in the old sense of the word'. In keeping with a Nietzschean gloss on Social Darwinism, Inner Party members seek power for its own sake: 'power is not a means, it is an end', a leading Inner Party member insists. Ultimately the Party's power rests upon its ability to manipulate the past: 'Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.' The Party even insists that 'Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else.'[48]

If imperfect, the system nonetheless functions adequately. Amidst an atmosphere of drabness, shortages and monotony, the novel recounts the clumsy rebellion of Winston Smith, an anti-heroic lower-level Outer Party member, whose crimes are writing a diary and having an affair with Julia, Orwell's crudely drawn female character, who is 'corrupt to the bones'. Winston is of course caught, tortured and then rehabilitated. At the end 'He loved Big Brother.' As a satire or caricature of totalitarianism the novel focuses on two dominant themes. The first is the totalitarian demand for complete loyalty, which requires slavish submission by the intellectuals, the debasement of logic and language ('doublethink' and 'newspeak'), the

evocation of the worst popular passions ('Hate Week'), and hostility to individualism ('ownlife'), with even eroticism suppressed in the name of war-fever and leader-worship. Secondly, there is the omnipresence of state power: the telescreen, the posters of Big Brother (who may or may not actually exist), the ubiquitous Thought Police, the continuous rewriting of the past. The grotesquely simple and blatantly unapologetic dishonesty of the regime stands out for many commentators as the grand theme of the work; one of Orwell's greatest concerns about totalitarianism was that it attacked the concept of objective truth. We are not led by Orwell to believe that this regime is likely to collapse from internal pressures, for the Party stifles its own dissent easily. Winston reflects, thus, that 'if there was hope, it must lie in the proles'.[49] But they are kept from rebelling by a diet of mass literature, heavy physical work, films, football, beer and gambling. No one cares what they say, and Winston is informed, in a crude paraphrasing of Marxist theory, that they could not rebel until they were conscious, and vice versa. Nonetheless the proles retain a moral honesty and authenticity which Orwell clearly believed they possessed in real life. They, crucially, have not been corrupted by power-worship. Neither, at least not completely, has Winston, left pondering his fate at the Chestnut Tree café. But then his rebellion never stood much chance of success anyway.

The corruption of the intelligentsia by the lust for power, then, remains the central and most compelling theme of Orwell's chief work, and one which we have seen was clearly foreshadowed in his major writings from the mid-1930s onwards. The nineteenth-century faith in the guiding role to be played in a post-aristocratic society by a Coleridgian clerisy or Carlylean man of letters had thus been utterly misplaced. As Richard Rees has written, Orwell's main conclusion respecting contemporary politics was that the working class lacked 'any power to counteract the decadence of the intellectuals and the bestiality of the hate-mongering political fanatics'.[50] Orwell himself, in his final years, and despite chronic poor health, clearly attempted some reckoning with this increasingly pessimistic assessment. In a book review published in 1945 he proclaimed the necessity of restoring what he termed 'the religious attitude of life' in order to counteract 'the disastrous consequences of worshipping man instead of God'. He became convinced (perhaps quite erroneously) that 'the modern cult of power worship is bound up with the modern man's feeling that life here and now is the only life there is'.[51] Yet at the same time he had himself lost his religious faith, and could propose no secular alternative to either religion or power-worship. Re-establishing a sense of moral certainty eluded him to the end, though it remained crucial to his hope for the future. For capitalism, he proclaimed, in reviewing Friedrich Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*,

produced only 'dole queues, the scramble for markets, and war', while collectivism led 'to concentration camps, leader worship, and war'. There seemed to be no alternative to this dismal choice between possible human fates, 'unless a planned economy can be somehow combined with freedom of the individual, which can only happen if the concept of right and wrong is restored to politics'.[52] Orwell did not know how this plea for decency, which some have seen as his central and abiding concern, might be realized. But he still believed in (what many Cold War readers failed to acknowledge) democratic socialism of a non-Marxian and peculiarly English type to be a step in the right direction, if somehow 'the religious attitude of life' could be wedded to it.

There are thus major differences as well as similarities between Huxley's and Orwell's visions of the future nightmare. Huxley's is clean, efficient, complacent, defined by pleasure, Orwell's clumsy, crude, brutal and focused on pain. Huxley penetrated much further into the behavioural psychology of consumer society. Yet Orwell captured the true horrors of the twentieth century far more accurately, and the manipulative nature of popular, mass culture is an essential ingredient in his description of it: what stood between Huxley and the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was Hitler. Huxley had foreseen what Wells seemingly had not, the dark side of machine civilization, that progress was 'a swindle' (and Wells, Orwell too would allege, was incapable of appreciating the real threat of totalitarianism). Rees has argued that 'Aldous Huxley's theory is equally plausible: that people can be reduced to a servile condition by means of mass-suggestion, hypnopaedia and drugs, without any overt brutality or cruelty and without any conscious suffering.'[53] Orwell did not agree with Huxley and other 'neo-pessimists', or with a religious reckoning which was not essentially geared to the improvement of public morals. (It has been contended that Orwell was moving back towards Christianity. But evidence for this is slight; Orwell would reiterate the need to 'reinstate the belief in human brotherhood without the need of a "next world" to give it meaning'.[54]) With Huxley he agreed that truth-telling, history-writing, was essential to keeping society in balance. And he shared with Huxley, but in a much deeper and intense way, a sense of the betrayal of the intellectuals as a class, of their descent into the mental preoccupation with a 'struggle for power'. It was this *voluntary* betrayal, not instigated by breeding, which produced Orwell's dictatorship, though it did not touch the essential humanity of the working classes, whose decency was epitomized by their behaviour in Barcelona in 1937. Huxley continued to maintain that control based upon reward was likely to be more effective, in the long run, than that based upon violence. But Orwell came to see Huxley's 'completely

materialistic vulgar civilization based on hedonism' as 'a danger past', and vastly less threatening than totalitarianism, contending that instead:

> we are in danger of quite a different kind of world, the centralised slave state, ruled over by a small clique who are in effect a new ruling class, though they might be adoptive rather than hereditary. Such a state would not be hedonistic, on the contrary its dynamic would come from some kind of rabid nationalism and leader-worship.[55]

Hence he condemned *Brave New World* for not providing an account of the motive of this ruling class, for not providing a reason 'why society should be stratified in the elaborate way that is described', particularly in terms of 'power-hunger'.[56] And Huxley was satirizing the desire for equality, which Orwell essentially admired and supported. Critics thus agree that Zamyatin's *We* was much closer in intent and design to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*; indeed Orwell thought Huxley owed an unacknowledged debt to it. For Zamyatin, with Arthur Koestler in *Darkness at Noon* and Jack London in *The Iron Heel*, possessed 'an intuitive grasp of the irrational side of totalitarianism – human sacrifice, cruelty as an end in itself, the worship of a Leader who is credited with divine attributes',[57] and it was this which in Orwell's view made Zamyatin's book superior to Huxley's.

Conclusion: Some other dystopian trends after 1900

Besides the major texts assessed so far here, a number of other twentieth-century dystopias merit mention. In some cases apparent dystopias were vehicles for socialist propaganda and aimed at capitalism, as in London's *The Iron Heel* (1907), where an 'Oligarchy' of 'trusts' or capitalist dictatorship is orchestrated from Wall Street, and opposed by socialist revolutionaries.[58] Feminist writers also contributed a variety of other dystopian visions in this period, including Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *With Her in Ourland* (1916), a response in part to her own utopian *Herland* (1915).[59] Extremely long-term evolutionary themes prevail in Olaf Stapledon's *Last and First Men* (1930), in which many existing dystopian ideas – American predominance, an emergent American World State which collapses, eugenic manipulation – are explored. In Stapledon it is the most vulgar American traits which triumph.[60] The rise of fascism provoked a number of fictional satires. In the best-known of these, Katharine Burdekin's *Swastika Night* (1937), a pioneering feminist critique, it is the triumph of the 'soldierly virtues' of bloodshed, brutality and ruthlessness against the Christian virtues of gentleness, mercy and love which mark modern degeneracy.[61] Many subsequent works would portray a damning indictment of hedonism as a

central and possibly fatal moral weakness of western liberal societies, such as Ray Bradbury's famous *Fahrenheit 451* (1953). Other notable contributions after the Second World War include William Golding's *The Lord of the Flies* (1954), Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange* (1962), Pierre Boulle's *Planet of the Apes* (1963), Robert Rimmer's *The Harrad Experiment* (1966), Ira Levin's *This Perfect Day* (1970) and Ernest Callenbach's *Ecotopia* (1975). Notable later feminist dystopias include Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* (1986), which is set in the United States in the near future. A number of these are discussed in later essays in this volume.

NOTES

1 See Lyman Tower Sargent, 'The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited', *Utopian Studies* 5:1 (1994), 1–37. On dystopia, see Mark Hillegas, *The Future as Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the Anti-Utopians* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967); W. Warren Wagar, *Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); M. Keith Booker, *The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Erika Gottlieb, *Utopian Fiction East and West* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

2 Herbert Marcuse, *Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).

3 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, rev. edn (Princeton University Press, 1950).

4 Reprinted in Gregory Claeys (ed.), *Utopias of the British Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

5 T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population; or, a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness; with an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Effects which it Occasions. A New Edition, very much Enlarged* (1798) (London: Printed for J. Johnson by T. Bensley, 1803).

6 Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus* (London: n.p., 1818).

7 Karl Pearson, *The Ethic of Freethought and Other Addresses and Essays* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1888), p. 319.

8 On these texts see Gregory Claeys (ed.), *Late Victorian Utopias* (6 vols., London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008), introduction.

9 Richard Jefferies, *After London; or, Wild England* (London: Cassell & Co, 1885).

10 Edward Carpenter, *Ioläus: An Anthology of Friendship* (1908) (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1917).

11 On Wells's dystopian writings, see in particular Bernard Bergonzi, *The Early H. G. Wells: A Study of the Scientific Romances* (Manchester University Press, 1961); John Huntington, *The Logic of Fantasy: H. G. Wells and Science Fiction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Frank McConnell, *The Science Fiction of H. G. Wells* (Oxford University Press, 1981); Patrick Parrinder, *Shadows of the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy* (Syracuse University Press, 1995). A good overview of Wells's writings is J. R. Hammond, *An*

H. G. Wells Companion (London: Macmillan, 1979). Wells's attitudes towards science are particularly explored in Roslynn D. Haynes, *H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

12 H. G. Wells, *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods* (London: Odham's Press, n.d.), p. 249; *The Time Machine* (London: Heinemann, 1937), p. 84; *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (London: William Heinemann, 1896), p. 116; *When the Sleeper Awakes* (London: Harper, 1899), pp. 69, 169, 236.

13 H. G. Wells, *The First Men in the Moon* (London: G. Newnes, 1901), p. 129.

14 Yevgeny Zamyatin, *We* (1921) (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 186.

15 George Orwell, *The Complete Works*, ed. Peter Davison (20 vols., London: Secker & Warburg, 1998), vol. 18, p. 15.

16 A good introduction is Katie de Koster (ed.), *Readings on Brave New World* (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999).

17 George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* (4 vols., London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 295.

18 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), p. 12.

19 Sybille Bedford, *Aldous Huxley: A Biography* (2 vols., London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), vol. 1, p. 244.

20 Huxley, *Brave New World*, pp. 174, 184–5, 167, 44.

21 Aldous Huxley, *Themes and Variations* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950), p. 247.

22 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited* (London: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 4, 13.

23 Aldous Huxley, *Proper Studies* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929), p. 13.

24 Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited*, p. 110.

25 Bedford, *Aldous Huxley*, vol. 2, p. 241.

26 Aldous Huxley, *Island* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), p. 210.

27 Huxley, *Proper Studies*, p. ix.

28 Huxley, *Proper Studies*, pp. 157, 215; *Ends and Means. An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for their Realization* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937), pp. 3, 59, 62; *Collected Essays* (London: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 257; *Ends and Means*, pp. 59, 62.

29 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949).

30 For a contrast of the texts, see Peter Firchow, *The End of Utopia: A Study of Aldous Huxley's 'Brave New World'* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1984) and Jenni Calder, *Huxley and Orwell, 'Brave New World' and 'Nineteen Eighty-Four'* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976). The literature on Orwell is now large. A good introduction is John Rodden (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). The standard biography is Bernard Crick, *George Orwell: A Life* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980).

31 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 359.

32 Crick, *George Orwell*, p. 16.

33 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 1, p. 26.

34 George Orwell, *The Complete Novels of George Orwell* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), pp. 96, 113.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 632.

36 Orwell, *Complete Works*, vol. 11, p. 28.

37 George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937) (London: Secker & Warburg, 1959), pp. 99, 202.

38 Orwell, *Complete Novels*, pp. 442–3.
39 Crick, *George Orwell*, p. 239.
40 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 2, p. 29.
41 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 40–2.
42 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 103.
43 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 47.
44 Richard Rees, *George Orwell: Fugitive from the Camp of Victory* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961), p. 116; John Mander, 'George Orwell's Politics', *Contemporary Review* (1960), 118.
45 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 564.
46 Studies of the text include: William Steinhoff, *The Road to 1984* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975); Irving Howe (ed.), *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century* (London: Harper & Row, 1983); Peter Stansky (ed.), *On Nineteen Eighty-Four* (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1983); Ejner J. Jensen (ed.), *On the Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984); Paul Chilton and Crispin Aubrey (eds.), *Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984* (London: Comedia Publishing Group, 1983).
47 James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (London: Putnam, 1942), p. 69. Orwell wrote no less than five times between 1944 and 1947 on this book. Burnham in turn summarized the views of various writers, notably Mosca, Michels, Ostrogorski, Pareto and Sorel.
48 Orwell, *Complete Novels*, pp. 863, 886.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 783.
50 Rees, *George Orwell*, p. 84.
51 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 3, p. 126.
52 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 144.
53 Rees, *George Orwell*, p. 116.
54 Orwell, *Complete Works*, vol. 12, p. 126.
55 *Ibid.*, vol. 15, p. 310.
56 *Ibid.*, vol. 18, p. 15.
57 Orwell, *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 75.
58 Jack London, *The Iron Heel* (New York: Macmillan, 1907).
59 Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *With Her in Ourland* (1916) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997); *Herland* (1915) (New York: Panther, 1979).
60 Olaf Stapledon, *Last and First Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future* (London: Methuen & Co., 1930), p. 30.
61 Katharine Burdekin, *Swastika Night* (1937) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bedford, Sybille, *Aldous Huxley: A Biography* (2 vols., London: Chatto & Windus, 1973).
Bergonzi, Bernard, *The Early H. G. Wells: A Study of the Scientific Romances* (Manchester University Press, 1961).
Blatchford, Robert, *The Sorcery Shop* (London: Clarion Press, 1907).
Booker, M. Keith, *The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).
Burdekin, Katharine, *Swastika Night* (1937) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985).

Burnham, James, *The Managerial Revolution* (London: Putnam, 1942).

Calder, Jenni, *Huxley and Orwell: 'Brave New World' and 'Nineteen Eighty-Four'* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976).

Carpenter, Edward, *Ioläus: An Anthology of Friendship* (1908) (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1917).

Chilton, Paul and Crispin Aubrey (eds.), *Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984* (London: Comedia Publishing Group, 1983).

Claeys, Gregory, *The French Revolution Debate in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).

Claeys, Gregory (ed.), *Late Victorian Utopias* (6 vols., London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008).

   (ed.) *Modern British Utopias 1700–1850* (8 vols., London: Pickering and Chatto, 1997).

   (ed.) *Utopias of the British Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Crick, Bernard, *George Orwell: A Life* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980).

de Koster, Katie (ed.), *Readings on Brave New World* (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999).

Firchow, Peter, *The End of Utopia: A Study of Aldous Huxley's 'Brave New World'* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1984).

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, *Herland* (1915) (New York: Panther, 1979).

   With Her in Ourland (1916) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997).

Gottlieb, Erika, *Utopian Fiction East and West* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

Hammond, J. R., *An H. G. Wells Companion* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

Hay, William, *Three Hundred Years Hence* (London: Newman & Co., 1881).

Haynes, Roslynn D., *H. G. Wells: Discoverer of the Future* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

Hillegas, Mark, *The Future as Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the Anti-Utopians* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967).

Howe, Irving (ed.), *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century* (London: Harper & Row, 1983).

Huntington, John, *The Logic of Fantasy: H. G. Wells and Science Fiction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

Huxley, Aldous, *Brave New World* (1932) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955).

   Brave New World Revisited (1958) (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

   Collected Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

   Ends and Means: An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for their Realization (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937).

   Island (London, Chatto & Windus, 1962).

   Proper Studies (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929).

   Themes and Variations (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950).

Jefferies, Richard, *After London; or, Wild England* (London: Cassell & Co, 1885).

Jensen, Ejner J. (ed.), *On the Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984).

London, Jack, *The Iron Heel* (New York: Macmillan, 1907).

Malthus, T. R., *An Essay on the Principle of Population; or, a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness; with an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Effects which it Occasions.*

> *A New Edition, very much Enlarged* (1798) (London: Printed for J. Johnson by T. Bensley, 1803).

Mander, John, 'George Orwell's Politics', *Contemporary Review* (1960).

Marcuse, Herbert, *Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970).

McConnell, Frank, *The Science Fiction of H. G. Wells* (Oxford University Press, 1981).

Morris, William, *The Collected Letters of William Morris*, ed. Norman Kelvin (4 vols., Princeton University Press, 1987).

Orwell, George, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* (4 vols., London: Secker & Warburg, 1968).

> *The Complete Novels of George Orwell* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).

> *The Complete Works*, ed. *Peter Davison* (20 vols., London: Secker & Warburg, 1998).

> *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949).

> *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937) (London: Secker & Warburg, 1959).

Parrinder, Patrick, *Shadows of the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

Pearson, Karl, *The Ethic of Freethought and Other Addresses and Essays* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1888).

Popper, Karl, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, rev. edn (Princeton University Press, 1950).

Rees, Richard, *George Orwell: Fugitive from the Camp of Victory* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961).

Rodden, John (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Sargent, Lyman Tower, 'The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited', *Utopian Studies* 5:1 (1994), 1–37.

Shelley, Mary, *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus* (London: n.p., 1818).

Stansky, Peter (ed.), *On Nineteen Eighty-Four* (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1983).

Stapledon, Olaf, *Last and First Men* (London: Methuen & Co., 1930).

Steinhoff, William, *The Road to 1984* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975).

Wagar, W. Warren, *Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

Wells, H. G., *The First Men in the Moon* (London: G. Newnes, 1901).

> *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (London: William Heinemann, 1896).

> *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods* (London: Odham's Press, n.d.).

> *When the Sleeper Awakes* (London: Harper, 1899).

> *The Time Machine* (London: Heinemann, 1937).

Zamyatin, Yevgeny, *We* (1921) (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).